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TRYSTS OR TERRORISTS? 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR 
BAD GUYS 
Richard K. Gordon* 
INTRODUCTION 
In early March of 2008, the news broke that Eliot Spitzer, the 
then-current Governor and former Attorney General of New York, 
had been involved in purchasing sexual favors from an elite escort 
service called the Emperors Club.1  What was unusual about the 
unfolding story was not just that a sitting governor would patronize 
such an establishment, but that his involvement had apparently 
been uncovered in part as a result of reports filed by banks under 
federal anti–money laundering policies and policies combating the 
financing of terrorism.2  Spitzer’s secret love life had been exposed 
by a regime designed primarily to catch serious criminals and 
terrorist financers and to grab their funds for the public fisc.3 
Apparently Governor Spitzer had paid for services by having his 
bank, North Fork, transfer funds from his account to at least two 
“shell” companies controlled by the Emperors Club.4  According to 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law; Visiting Fellow in International Studies, the Watson Institute, Brown 
University, Fall 2008.  B.A. 1978, Yale; J.D. 1984, Harvard.  From 1994 through 
2003 the author served as a senior staff member at the International Monetary 
Fund where he worked on the development and implementation of the 
international standards for anti-money laundering and, following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States, combating the financing of 
terrorism.  The views expressed in this paper are the author’s alone and should 
not be attributed to the International Monetary Fund.  The author would like to 
thank Professor Craig Boise and the participants in the Wake Forest Law 
Review Symposium for their comments and the students who participated in 
the Spring 2007 Case Western Reserve University School of Law seminar 
Financial Sector Integrity for their contribution to this article. 
 1. Danny Hakim & William Rashbaum, Spitzer, Linked to a Sex Ring as a 
Client, Gives an Apology, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/10/nyregion/10cndspitzer.html?_r=1&hp&oref
=slogin. 
 2. Moisés Naím, Caught in the Wrong Net; Spitzer and the CEO Were Both 
Toppled by a Post-9/11 Hardening of Views on Global Money Laundering, 
NEWSWEEK (International Edition), Mar. 31, 2008, available at 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/128422. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Keith B. Richburg et al., FBI Watched Spitzer Before February  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1371600
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an article in Newsweek by Moisés Naím (who is also the editor of 
Foreign Policy): 
The inquiry into the Emperors Club . . . began last year, 
whena bank, HSBC, reported to U.S. Authorities [meaning 
FinCen,the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network] that the 
accountsof two companies, QAT and QAT Consulting Group, 
wereregularly receiving deposits from questionable sources.  
Severalof the transfers had come from accounts that seemed 
set up tomask the sender’s identity.  The investigation 
ultimatelyrevealed that the person in question wasn’t a drug 
dealer or aterrorist.  It was the governor of New York.5  
Newsday reported that the investigation began with “tips” from 
banks that noticed unusual wire transfers between Spitzer’s account 
and “shell companies,” i.e. QAT International and QAT Consulting 
Group, set up by the Emperors Club.6 According to the affidavit filed 
in support of the sealed complaint, QAT Consulting Group, Inc. and 
QAT International, Inc. were used to “promote” and “conceal” the 
prostitution business of the Emperors Club.7  Again according to 
news reports, both Spitzer’s bank and the bank where QAT and 
QAT Consulting Group held accounts filed Suspicious Activity 
Reports (“SARs”) with the government, which ultimately led to an 
investigation of Spitzer and the Emperors Club.8 
While press reports vary, the more specific facts appear to be 
these.  North Fork detected Spitzer engaging in “unusual financial 
transactions” by making “large cash transfers” that did not fit his 
“usual pattern for the accounts,” which triggered concern in the 
bank.9  One source also reported that, after transferring the funds, 
Spitzer called North Fork and asked that his name “be removed” 
from one of the wires, which lead the bank to file a SAR.10  The 
affidavit attached to the SAR quoted a telephone call from an 
 
Incident, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/story/2008/03/11/ST2008031102
183.html. 
 5. Naím, supra note 3. 
 6. Michael Amon, Rival Tipped Feds; Controversial GOP  
Operative’s Letter to FBI About Spitzer’s Trysts ‘Taint’s Probe of Former Guv,” 
Prof Says, NEWSDAY, March 24, 2008, at A7. 
 7. Sealed Complaint at 33, United States v. Brener, 08 Mag. 0463 
[hereinafter Sealed Complaint].  See also id. at 31–33. 
 8. Don Van Natta, Jr. & Jo Becker, Bank Reports, Then Wiretapping, Led 
to Unraveling of Ring and Its Client, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 2008, at A20, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/13/nyregion/13legal.html?scp=1 
&sq=Bank+Reports%2C+Then+Wiretapping%2C+Led+to+Unraveling+of+Ring
+and+Its+Client+9&st=nyt. 
 9. Jonathan D. Epstein, Spitzer Didn’t Bank on Money Trail Fiasco, 
BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 16, 2008, at A13. 
 10. John Sandman, Spitzer SAR Disclosure an AML Breach,  
SEC. INDUS. NEWS, Mar. 31, 2008, at 1, available at 
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-34232673_ITM. 
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Emperors Club employee who said that Spitzer did not “do 
traditional wire transferring.”11  Another source stated that 
suspicion was also raised because “Spitzer had tried to break down 
large wire transfers into amounts smaller than $10,000, seemingly 
to get around federal reporting rules.”12  Another source suggested 
that the bank may have filed a SAR as revenge for Spitzer’s efforts 
when he was New York Attorney General to force the bank to refund 
$20,000 in what Spitzer claimed had been illegal fees.13  Another 
possibility was that the bank was especially vigilant because Spitzer 
was, as Governor, “a politically exposed person” and therefore more 
likely to be soliciting bribes.14  Still another source reported that 
sometime later, HSBC Bank filed one or more SARs when its 
employees “investigated” QAT International and QAT Consulting 
Group, both of which had accounts at the bank, and discovered that 
HSBC’s files for the companies “included virtually no 
information . . . due diligence was not done—there was no Dun & 
Bradstreet, no documentation, almost nothing in the file . . . ”15  
FinCEN then passed on the SARs to the Internal Revenue Service, 
which began an investigation.16 
Press reports differed on exactly why the IRS pressed forward 
with an investigation, which included wiretaps and a criminal 
complaint.  One suggests that it was the combination of SARs from 
North Fork and HSBC that started the investigation.17  Another 
said the investigation may have started much earlier when the 
lawyers representing Roger J. Stone Jr., a Republican political 
consultant, “wrote a letter to the F.B.I. stating that Gov. Eliot 
Spitzer had patronized high-priced prostitutes during trips to 
Florida.”18  Other sources suggested that when government 
authorities discovered that the SARs concerned a senior government 
official, they had to investigate further.19  Another quoted a defense 
 
 11. Sealed Complaint, supra note 8, at 27. 
 12. Melanie Lefkowitz & Michael Amon, Wife, Close Aide Urged Spitzer to 
Stay, Say Sources, NEWSDAY, Mar. 16, 2008, at A8. 
 13. Tony Allen Mills, Toppling of the Luv Guv is ‘Wall Street Revenge,’  
THE SUNDAY TIMES (London), Mar. 16, 2008, available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/us_elections 
/article3559410.ece. 
 14. Van Natta & Becker, supra note 9. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.; New York Governor Spitzer Resigns in Prostitution Scandal; 
Federal Probe Ensnares High-Priced Ring, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, 
Mar. 13, 2008, at A3. 
 18. Danny Hakim & Fernanda Santos, G.O.P. Consultant Says His 
Lawyers Told F.B.I. in ‘07 of Alleged Spitzer Trysts, N.Y. TIMES,  
Mar. 24, 2008, at B5, available  at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/24 
/nyregion/24spitzer.html?scp=1&sq=G.O.P.+Consultant+Says+His+Lawyers 
+Told+F.B.I.+in+%9207+of+Alleged+Spitzer+Trysts&st=nyt. 
 19. David Johnston & Philip Shenon, U.S. Defends Tough Tactics  
on Spitzer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2008 at A1, available at 
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lawyer who said, ‘‘[i]f the government gets a SAR about a high-
ranking public official, they would be negligent not to pursue it, if 
only to determine whether there was bribery or extortion 
involved.”20 
A number of commentators noted, however, that while the 
system was designed to ferret out major criminals and terrorists,21 
instead it snared a man hiring a prostitute, which is not a crime 
normally on the authorities’ radar screen.22  Another commentator 
quoted Don Van Natta, Jr., a former director of FinCEN.  “What 
9/11 taught us is the value of financial information,” Van Natta said.  
“Money doesn’t lie.  Money leaves a footprint.  And that’s exactly 
what happened with Spitzer.”23 
Although not all of the press reports are fully consistent (and 
many rely on unverifiable sources), there are a number of key issues 
surrounding how the Spitzer/Emperors Club case apparently 
unfolded.  First, Spitzer made payments to the Emperors Club 
indirectly through QAT International and QAT Consulting Group, 
companies controlled by the Club.24  Spitzer ordered his bank either 
to wire money to the bank accounts of one or more of the companies, 
which then held the cash until it was withdrawn by the Emperors 
Club or its owners, or to wire the money on to a bank account held 
directly by the Emperors Club or its owners.25  Both Spitzer’s bank 
and the shell companies’ bank were monitoring the transactions of 
their account holders and decided to make a report to FinCEN when 
they discovered something “suspicious.”26  With respect to Spitzer, 
reasons for suspicion included that his account activities did not fit 
his usual pattern of account activity, he had apparently broken 
down larger transfers into smaller amounts, he had tried to delete 
his name from one or more transfers, and he was an important 
politician.27  With respect to QAT International and QAT Consulting 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/nyregion/21justice.html?scp=1&sq=U.S.+D
efends+Tough+Tactics+with+Spitzer&st=nyt. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Van Natta & Becker, supra note 8. 
 24. Brian Ross, It Wasn’t the Sex; Suspicious $$ Transfers Led to Spitzer, 
ABC NEWS, Mar. 10, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=4424507. 
 25. Money Transfers Spark Spitzer Probe, UPI.COM, Mar. 12, 2008, 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/03/12/Money_transfers_spark_Spitzer 
_probe/UPI-92401205333210. 
 26. Van Natta & Becker, supra note 8. 
 27. See Mario Bruno-Britz, Spitzer Exposed by Bank’s Anti-Money 
Laundering Technology, BANK SYSTEMS & TECH., Mar. 27, 2008, available at 
http://www.banktech.com/aml/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=206904957; Robert 
Kessler, Eliot Spitzer’s Bank Turned Him In to the IRS, NEWSDAY,  
March 11, 2008, available at http://www.newsday.com/news/local/state 
/ny-stspitzerbank0312,0,4637246.story; Lessons from Spitzer’s Fall, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 13, 2008, at 8, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0313/p08s01-comv.html; see also supra note 20. 
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Group, the main reason for suspicion was that they were shell 
companies and that the bank had previously failed to conduct “due 
diligence” by creating a client profile regarding the companies’ 
activities.28  FinCEN apparently matched the two reports, and 
reported this information to the IRS, which noted the suspicious 
nature of the transactions, including Spitzer’s position as attorney 
general, and began the investigation leading to his downfall.29 
As will be discussed in greater detail infra, each of the details of 
the transactions would normally raise suspicion under not only U.S. 
anti-money laundering and financing of terrorism (“AML/CFT”) 
rules, but under the AML/CFT international standard as well.30  In 
fact, anyone familiar with these rules can only wonder why someone 
would so obviously trigger the possibility of an investigation rather 
than simply pay the Emperors Club directly.  One possibility might 
be that Spitzer was trying to hide his involvement in the event that 
there was an investigation of the club.  However, as the former 
director of FinCEN noted, such a relatively minor detour would not 
cover up his involvement in the event of such an investigation since 
there would still be records of the payments made from Spitzer’s 
account to the accounts of the two shell companies.  One report 
speculated that the reason Spitzer took such minor steps to conceal 
or obfuscate the transactions was not to hide his payments to the 
Emperors Club from law enforcement, which rarely prosecutes 
consensual sex for pay, but instead to keep the facts from his family, 
especially his wife.31 
Spitzer’s transactions that resulted in the filing of SARs—and 
that resulted in the commencement of a formal criminal 
investigation—can be contrasted with a common transaction 
involving the financing of terrorism.  One typical example cited in a 
recent report on terrorism financing by the Financial Action Task 
Force (“FATF”) involves a legitimate charity that quickly raised 
large amounts of funds from the local community.32  A controller of 
the charity diverted a portion of these donations to terrorist training 
camps in Pakistan. The transactions consisted of domestic transfers 
to the charity and international transfers to an individual, who then 
turned the money over to the terrorists.  There were no circuitous 
payments as in the Spitzer case—the transactions were actually 
quite simple and direct.  The only indication that terrorism 
financing might be involved was that law enforcement had reason to 
believe that the charity’s controller had some connection with people 
 
 28. Van Natta & Becker, supra note 8. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 31. Stevenson Swanson, Spitzer Quits in Remarkable Fall from Grace, CHI. 
TRIB., Mar. 13, 2008, at 1. 
 32. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, TERRORIST FINANCING 12 (2008), 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf. 
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suspected of being involved in terrorist activities, including the 
individual who received the payments from the charity.  The report 
notes that “[l]aw enforcement assessed that the charity was being 
exploited both as a ‘front’ to raise funds and as a ‘means of 
transmission’ to divert a portion of them to known terrorist 
associates of A.”33  However, the transactions themselves were not 
suspicious.34 
In a typical transaction, a legitimate (or sometimes illegitimate) 
charity collects cash and other donations and deposits those to a 
bank account in a western country, then makes a payment directly 
to the bank account of another charitable organization or business 
location in another country, often a jurisdiction with serious internal 
conflict, including terrorism.35  Often, some or all of that money is 
then diverted to finance terrorism while some is used for legitimate 
charitable activity.36  If terrorists are smarter (or at least more 
knowledgeable) than Eliot Spitzer, one would expect that they would 
not arrange their financial affairs in such a way that would trigger 
the filing of SARs resulting in subsequent investigations.  There 
may be other reasons that a bank may discover and report that a 
client may be financing terrorism (for example, they know that the 
client associates with known terrorists).  However, one can assume 
that the terrorists would try to not follow former Governor Spitzer’s 
lead by adding circuitous transactions that might result in the filing 
of a SAR. 
Having demonstrating a few of the key features of some factors 
that may trigger a bank to alert law enforcement as to possible 
illegal activity and for the government to conduct a follow-up 
investigation, and having suggested that terrorist financing may not 
often follow such detectable patterns, this Article will turn to a 
fundamental problem that goes to the heart of AML/CFT policies, or 
at least those that focus on banks and other financial institutions.  
There is a constant and unresolved tension between how much 
financial institutions should be expected to do and how much the 
government should be expected to do to uncover criminals, 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., MATTHEW LEVITT, HAMAS: POLITICS, CHARITY, AND TERRORISM 
IN THE SERVICE OF JIHAD 62–69, 72 (2006) (discussing Hamas fundraising and 
money laundering). The author is currently engaged in a project to examine 
terrorism financing techniques, sponsored by the United Nations Counter-
Terrorism Implementation Task Force.  Although there have been a few 
exceptions, the examples of terrorism financing examined so far generally fit 
into the pattern described above. 
 36. Pierre-Emmanuel Ly, The Charitable Activities of Terrorist 
Organizations, 131 PUB. CHOICE 177, 178–79 (2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=951003 (noting that terrorist groups support 
both legitimate charitable activity and terrorism, in part to generate political 
support from their legitimate activity). 
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especially terrorists and their financiers.37  According to the 
internationally accepted AML/CFT regime,38 financial institutions39 
 
 37. See, e.g., CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR (CGAP), AML/CFT 
REGULATION: COULD INCREASING ACCESS IMPROVE SECURITY? (2008), 
http://64.127.136.149/portal/site/portfolio/Feb2008FAI/. 
 38. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, THE 40 RECOMMENDATIONS  
(2004), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/28/0,3343,en_32250379 
_32236930_33658140_1_1_1_1,00.html [hereinafter FATF 40]; THE FINANCIAL 
ACTION TASK FORCE, 9 SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3343,en_32250379 
_32236920_34032073_1_1_1_1,00.html [hereinafter FATF SPECIAL IX]; 
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH 
THE FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE FATF 9 SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
(2007), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/16/54/40339628.pdf 
[hereinafter FATF METHODOLOGY].  Each has been adapted as part of a “global 
standard” for AML/CFT by vote of the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) 
Executive Board; see also IMF Advances Efforts to Combat Money Laundering 
and Terrorist Finance, Public Information Notice No. 02/87, August 8, 2002, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2002/pn0287.htm; 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, REPORT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE FATF 
PLENARY MEETING AND PROPOSAL FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY 
FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE 
FINANCING OF TERRORISM (AML/CFT) STANDARD 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2002/eng/110802.pdf [hereinafter IMF 
METHODOLOGY].  The author, who was a senior staff member at the IMF from 
1994 to 2004, was a principle author of IMF documents relating to AML/CFT 
during those years.  Also, each member of the FATF and each of the seven 
FATF-style regional bodies has accepted the FATF 40 + 9 as the global 
standard.  See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF MEMBERS  
AND OBSERVERS, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/52/0,3343,en 
_32250379_32237295_34027188_1_1_1_1,00.html (providing web links to each 
FATF-style regional body); see also PAUL ALLEN SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE TO 
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF  
TERRORISM III-5–III-8 (2d ed. 2006), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/Resources/396511-1146581427871 
/Reference_Guide_AMLCFT_2ndSupplement.pdf.  There are also a number of 
UN-sponsored conventions and Security Council Resolutions dealing with 
AML/CFT.  Id. at III–2 to –5.  But, these are incorporated into the FATF 
standard through the Methodology Document Recommendation 1 and Special 
Recommendations I, II, and III.  IMF METHODOLOGY, supra note 38, at 12, 62–
66. 
 39. Financial institutions include any person who engages in the following 
activities: acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public; 
lending; financial leasing; the transfer of money or value; issuing and managing 
means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, checks, traveler’s checks, money 
orders and bankers’ drafts, electronic money); financial guarantees and 
commitments; trading in money market instruments (checks, bills, CDs, 
derivatives etc.), foreign exchange, exchange, interest rate and index 
instruments, transferable securities, commodity futures trading; participation 
in securities issues and the provision of financial services related to such issues; 
individual and collective portfolio management; safekeeping and administration 
of cash or liquid securities on behalf of other persons; otherwise investing, 
administering or managing funds or money on behalf of other persons; and 
underwriting and placement of life insurance and other investment related 
insurance, money, and currency changing.  FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, 40 
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(and a few others),40 are required to implement a series of AML/CFT 
“preventive measures.”  These are rules that require financial 
institutions to identify and monitor their clients activities to see if 
they might be laundering criminal proceeds or financing terrorists.  
If the financial institution suspects they are, it must describe the 
cause for suspicion and make a report  to the government for further 
investigation.41  At least for regulated financial institutions (the 
most important of which in most developed countries are deposit-
taking institutions, securities firms, broker-dealers, insurance firms, 
and money transfer agents),42 it is the financial institution’s 
supervisors, regulators, and examiners who are tasked with 
ensuring that these “preventive measures” are effectively 
implemented.43  The United States largely follows the rules 
prescribed by the international AML/CFT standard.44 
These rules are fundamentally different in type and kind from 
the prudential rules that are also imposed on regulated financial 
institutions and whose implementation is a primary function of the 
financial institution’s supervisors, regulators, and examiners.  These 
rules are designed primarily to protect the safety and soundness of 
individual financial institutions and the financial system as whole, 
including, in particular, the customers of those financial 
institutions.  These rules are about not putting all investment 
(typically lending) eggs in one financial basket, or making sure that 
investors judge risk appropriately, or that banks have enough 
capital to pay depositors in the event of significant loan defaults:45 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS GLOSSARY, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/glossary/0,3414,en_32250379_32236889_35433764_1_1 
_1_1,00.html#34289432 (last visited Sept. 1, 2008). 
 40. This refers to casinos (which also includes internet casinos), real estate 
agents, dealers in precious metals, dealers in precious stones, lawyers, notaries, 
other independent legal professionals, and accountants.  See FATF 40, supra 
note 38, at 12. 
 41. Id. at 2–3.  See also infra notes 42–48 and accompanying text 
(discussing these rules in greater detail). 
 42. FATF, SUMMARIES, REPORTS AND ANNEXES, http://www.fatf 
-gafi.org/document/32/0,3343,en_32250379_32236982_35128416_1_1_1 
_1,00.html. 
 43. FATF 40, supra note 38, at 7–8 (describing Recommendations 23–25). 
 44. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT 
ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 299–303 (2006), available at http://www.fatf 
-gafi.org/dataoecd/44/9/37101772.pdf [hereinafter MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT].  
U.S. rules are discussed in greater detail infra.  See infra notes 45–48 and 
accompanying text. 
 45. See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION: THE BASEL 
CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION (1997), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.htm (explaining that the Core Principles cover 
seven principal areas: preconditions for effective banking supervision, licensing 
and structure, prudential regulations and requirements, methods of banking 
supervision, information and record-keeping requirements, formal powers of 
supervisors, and cross-border banking). 
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in other words, the kind of prudential rules that have not always 
been carefully observed in the past year.  But in general, the 
supervisors and the supervised, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency and the Federal Reserve Board and U.S. banks, for 
example,46 have similar goals with respect to prudential rules.  No 
one wants a bank or other financial institution to become illiquid or 
insolvent—not the bank’s owners, not the bank’s managers, and not 
the bank’s supervisors or examiners.  Each group tends to have 
similar interests, if not identical ones. 
Before AML rules were established, banks and other financial 
institutions did not consider themselves in the business of catching 
criminals, especially not terrorists.  Now, however, as a result of the 
creation and implementation of the global AML/CFT standard, they 
are.47  Much (though certainly not all) of the difficulty that financial 
institutions have in identifying and reporting suspected terrorist 
transactions lies in the difficulty they have in identifying suspected 
money laundering or the proceeds of crime.48  This is not a surprise 
given that the CFT rules relating to a financial institution’s 
responsibility to detect terrorism-financing transactions are based 
on the earlier, pre-existing AML rules.  For this reason it is 
necessary first to turn to the latter. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO MONEY LAUNDERING AND AML RULES 
This Article will discuss in detail key AML principles infra, but 
because it helps first to have a plain-language understanding and 
more common sense introduction to the issue, this Article briefly 
will review the key issues and apply them to the Spitzer and 
terrorism-financing cases. 
Sustained global interest in anti-money laundering policies 
began in the 1980s, primarily in the context of concern over 
international drug trafficking.  Because the drug trade (and other 
illegal activity) generated huge profits, criminals found it necessary 
to find a way to introduce the cash they made into the formal 
financial system so that it could be spent or invested without 
drawing the attention of law enforcement.  However, simply 
depositing huge amounts of cash at a single bank could also draw 
the attention of bank officials and, eventually, law enforcement. 
 
 46. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS, 
ABOUT THE OCC, available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm; THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, SUPERVISION AND 
REGULATION, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_5.pdf. 
 47. See, e.g., THE WOLFSBERG GROUP, WOLFSBERG AML PRINCIPLES, 
http://wolfsberg-principles.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2008); see also MARK PIETH 
& GEMMA AIOLFI, THE PRIVATE SECTOR BECOMES ACTIVE: THE WOLFSBERG 
PROCESS, available at http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/pdf/Wolfsberg 
-Process.pdf (discussing the origins of the Wolfsberg principles). 
 48. Eugene Yoo, The Institutional AML Challenge, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, 
Sept. 18, 2006, available at http://actimize.com/index.aspx?page=news21. 
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In the paradigm case, drug traffickers receive large sums of 
money in cash because those who purchase illegal drugs do not pay 
by check or credit card, which can be traced.  Because it looks rather 
odd, especially to the police, to carry around a trunk full of often 
filthy low-denomination currency to buy big ticket items and to 
make legitimate investments, the criminal needs to enter the cash 
into the formal financial system via a financial institution.  Doing so 
is referred to as the “placement stage.”49 
One of the first AML principles was to require financial 
institutions (especially banks, which are usually the point of entry 
in the financial system for cash) to identify exactly who their 
customers were and to report to the authorities whenever a 
customer deposited a substantial amount of cash.50  One benefit of 
knowing the identity of a customer is that the bank or law 
enforcement agency can identify the accounts of known criminals.  
Of course, some customers often legitimately receive or deposit huge 
amounts of cash, such as those running a 7-11 or some other cash-
intensive business.  In order to prevent constant reporting of 
unhelpful information, the bank, or at least the authorities, needs to 
be able to exclude these customers.  In order to determine if patterns 
of cash deposits do not suggest that the customer was receiving 
criminal proceeds, it is necessary for the bank to determine the 
customer’s legitimate activities and whether they could be expected 
to generate such cash.  Once a customer profile has been 
established, deposit patterns that do not fit that profile would 
legitimately generate some suspicion.  The bank could then 
investigate and see if the customer’s profile had changed such that 
the unusual transactions could be explained by some legitimate 
activity.  If not, the bank could report such suspicions without fear 
of generating too many false positives.  Such information might be 
enable law enforcement authorities to catch drug traffickers. 
Under the AML principles, once a bank was required to 
establish a customer profile, it would also be possible to determine 
when non-cash payments looked atypical (i.e. possibly the proceeds 
of crime).51  In other words, it would be able to detect whether the 
proceeds might be from crimes other than those that generated 
significant cash. This would allow AML rules to include other types 
of  crimes, meaning those that did not generate cash proceeds, as 
“predicate offenses” to suspected money laundering.52 In addition, 
 
 49. The background to the development of AML rules is described in many 
places, but for one of the best brief introductions, see SCHOTT, supra note 38, at 
I-7–I-9. 
 50. See, e.g., THE WOLFSBERG GROUP, WOLFSBERG AML PRINCIPLES ON 
PRIVATE BANKING (2002), http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/privat-
banking.html. 
 51. Id. 
 52.  See PETER REUTER & EDWIN M. TRUMAN, CHASING DIRTY MONEY: THE 
FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING 105 (2004). 
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patterns of payments from an account, as well as deposits into an 
account, could be monitored for transactions that did not fit the 
expected patterns of a customer. 
While this was the beginning, the AML system needed to 
become more complex and extensive in order to overcome evasive 
countermeasures taken by criminals to avoid being caught under 
anti-money laundering rules.  Criminals would avoid the cash 
transaction reporting requirements by “smurfing” or breaking up 
large cash deposits into smaller ones in many accounts opened by 
confederates or their lawyers, or by legal persons, like companies.53  
Money from these accounts would then be deposited to a single 
account held by the criminal.  In order to distance themselves 
further from the illegal origins of profits, criminals would then often 
make payments to others, including corporations or other legal 
persons.  This activity is typically called the “layering stage.”54  In 
order to aggregate such payments and to trace them through the 
payment chain, financial institutions need to be able to identify who 
the real owner of the account is (i.e. the beneficial owner or 
controller), and not just the legal titleholder to the account (i.e. the 
name on the account).  Because this can be difficult to ascertain, the 
financial institution would also want to know the customer profile of 
each person holding an account to see if it were normal for the 
customer to receive and make payments in a particular way.55 
 Because banking is international, every intervening bank would 
need to follow the same procedures and make the information 
available to law enforcement from other countries, which would then 
require cross-border cooperation.  For example: 
Assume a law professor has, in addition to her 
employment income, significant criminal proceeds from 
both narcotics sales and from defrauding her employer.  
Every month she receives $10,000 in cash from selling 
illegal stimulants to her first-year contracts students 
and $5,000 in reimbursements for fictional travel to 
law review symposia.  Her legitimate bank deposits 
would include such items as law professor wages, plus 
perhaps other miscellaneous small amounts (e.g. 
interest on savings accounts and the occasional holiday 
gift).  Her bank transactions would also include  
regular, often recurring payments (e.g. rent, utilities, 
and payments for credit card debt). 
 
 53. INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 
AUDIT & COMPLIANCE FORUM: GLOSSARY, http://www.iirusa.com/AMLAC2006 
/2688.xml (last visited Sept. 1, 2008). 
 54. Eduardo Aninat et al., Combating Money Laundering and  
the Financing of Terrorism, 39 FIN. & DEV. 3, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/09/aninat.htm. 
 55. See WOLFSBERG AML PRINCIPLES, supra note 47. 
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Under a client identification and cash reporting 
regime, any cash deposits into her bank account above 
a certain amount would trigger the filing of a report.  
The professor might seek to avoid such a filing by 
opening a number of accounts at different banks and 
depositing only small amounts of cash into each 
account.  However, if the bank is required to inquire as 
to the client’s profile of legitimate deposits and monitor 
actual deposits to see if they conform with that profile, 
the bank would inquire as to why a professor’s account 
involves only deposits of small amounts of cash rather 
than other transactions such as wage deposits, etc.  
Absent a suitable explanation, a SAR would be filed, in 
this case from each of the banks where the professor 
held a small cash account.  This would permit the 
financial intelligence unit to aggregate cash amounts 
from each, allowing the unit to pursue further 
investigation. 
In order to avoid such detection, the professor 
could enlist confederates, such as (other) lawyers, to 
open accounts on her behalf.  However, if the bank is 
also required, as part of the client identification 
requirement, to determine the beneficial owner of the 
account, the bank could trace the account back to the 
professor.  While the confederates could lie, this would, 
among other things, expose the confederate to criminal 
charges and make it more likely that the professor’s 
criminal activities would be discovered. 
An alternative would be for the professor to set up 
accounts in the names of companies and disguise the 
fact that she controlled the companies.  However, if the 
bank were required to seek identification of the 
beneficial owner and controller of the company, the 
bank could, again, trace the account back to the 
professor.  The professor could attempt to disguise this 
ownership though layers of companies, false 
shareholder or director names, etc., or even make 
identification harder by setting up the company in a 
foreign jurisdiction.  In these instances where 
identification of the beneficial owner would be difficult, 
the bank could be required to see if the company had a 
legitimate purpose, and, if it did not, to file a SAR. 
Eventually the professor would want to be able to 
use the money in the bank accounts without having to 
withdraw cash. This would mean that the professor 
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would have to make relatively small payments from 
the account either to another single account (known as 
aggregation) to be used to make a purchase, such as an 
investment, or to make many payments directly for a 
purchase or an investment.  In addition, if the bank is 
required to include as part of its client profile 
payments as well as deposits, these payments could 
also arouse suspicion.  The bank would be required to 
inquire as to why the client was making such 
payments if they did not correspond to some obvious 
legitimate aspect of the client’s daily life. 
In order to disguise aggregation or final payment, 
the professor might make payments to accounts held 
by a company set up for this purpose.  Again, the 
bank’s identification of beneficial owners or bona fides 
of the company could result in suspicion. 
Finally, once a bank is required to create a client 
profile and monitor transactions against that profile, 
non-cash deposits potentially representing proceeds of 
crime could also arouse suspicion. 
In a nutshell, the requirements that banks and other financial 
institutions identify customers, establish client profiles, monitor for 
unusual transactions, and report to the authorities if they detect 
something that looks as if it involved the proceeds of crime is the 
foundation of the AML “preventive measures” standard.  Once it is 
known to authorities that an account may contain the proceeds of 
crime, it would be possible to require the bank to freeze the account 
until its final province was adjudicated; if the contents turned out to 
be criminal proceeds, the money could be seized by the state.56 
Of course, it would be necessary to sanction a financial 
institution that failued to follow these rules.57  Sanctions could 
include criminal charges if the financial institution, or its 
employees, knew (or should have known) that it was assisting 
criminals in laundering proceeds of a predicate offense, which would 
require making money laundering a crime.58  It could also include 
 
 56. Bruce Zagaris, The Emergence of an International Anti-Money 
Laundering Regime: Implications for Counselling Businesses, in THE ALLEGED 
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL: THE SECOND BIENNIAL INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
SEMINAR 127, 204 (Richard D. Atkins ed. 1995). 
 57. See, e.g., Economic Sanctions Enforcement Procedures for  
Banking Institutions, 71 Fed. Reg. 1971 (Jan. 12, 2006), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/regs/fr71_1971.pdf. 
 58. See, e.g., The Bank Secrecy and the USA Patriot Act: Hearing Before the 
H. Committee on International Relations, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of 
Herbert A. Biern, Senior Associate Director, Division of Banking Supervision 
and Regulation), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs 
/testimony/2004/20041117/default.htm (describing the United States’ 
GORDON -- FINAL.DOC 9/8/08  10:12 AM 
114 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
making AML rules part of the general set of prudential rules that 
the supervisors of financial institutions must implement,59 even 
though, as noted above, they are not actually prudential in nature 
(nor similar with respect to the overlapping interests of both 
regulator/supervisor and regulated). 
It is easy to see why application of these principles would result 
in financial institutions and investigative authorities becoming 
interested in the Spitzer case, at least if key facts happened as they 
were presented in news reports.  First, there were payments that 
were unusual in that they did not fit the client’s profile.  Secondly, 
there were payments that could indicate smurfing as well as 
attempts by an account holder to hide his identity and companies 
whose client profiles could not be identified.  Finally, while 
identification of Spitzer’s original account did not turn up a known 
criminal, it did turn up an important politician. 
With respect to the charity-financing-of-terrorism example, 
there were none of these traits, except possibly one: if any of the 
account holders appeared to be known or suspected terrorists, then 
it would be a relatively simple task for the bank to report and for the 
authorities to investigate and act. 
What should be clear from even a layman’s perspective is that 
the transactions, when looked at together, do not really suggest 
laundering or corruption.  In question were payments Governor 
Spitzer was making, not payments he was receiving; even a cursory 
investigation would show that he neither owned nor controlled the 
Emperors Club or its shell companies.  If anything, he was making 
payments for something.  It turned out to be sex.  But why not 
terrorism? 
II. ORIGINS OF GLOBAL AML EFFORTS 
In order to counter money laundering, a number of countries, 
most notably the United States and France, took the lead in 
pressing for an international anti-money laundering effort.  The first 
major international agreement to enact uniform anti-money 
laundering laws was the UN Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (also called the Vienna 
Convention).60  The convention required all parties to enact 
legislation providing for the identification and confiscation of 
laundered drug money and to set out procedures of mutual legal 
 
implementation of sanctions for violation of the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. 
5311 et seq., and quoting the statement of Herbert A. Biern, Senior Associate 
Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation). 
 59. See SCHOTT, supra note 38, at V–23 to –25. 
 60. See generally United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, I.L.M. 493, 
available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf.  The original 
Treaty was adopted in 1988. 
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assistance in countering money laundering.  In 1990, the Council of 
Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (Strasbourg Convention) 
was convened,61 and the following year the first European Directive 
on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose 
of money laundering was adopted.62 
The next major international step to enhance global anti-money 
laundering efforts came with the creation of the Financial Action 
Task Force in 1989, following the G-7 Summit in Paris.63  The 
original task force consisted of sixteen member countries of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”), with the United States and France taking leadership 
roles.64  The task force was inter-governmental in nature, with 
members represented by financial supervisors, criminal 
investigators, and prosecutors.65  While it had a small secretariat, 
the work of the FATF was originally carried on almost entirely by 
its members.  Less than a year later the FATF published its first set 
of 40 Recommendations, which were designed to provide a 
comprehensive plan of action for fighting money laundering and 
which looked somewhat like an AML standard.  Drafted primarily 
by the United States, the Recommendations covered the 
criminalization of money laundering, the freezing and seizing of 
criminal proceeds, and the key preventive measures for financial 
institutions, such as customer identification and record keeping, 
transaction monitoring, and the filing of SARs when a financial 
institution suspected money laundering.  They also required cross-
border cooperation in investigating and prosecuting money 
laundering. 
In 1991, the FATF began its program of annual compliance self-
evaluations, requiring the completion of a questionnaire and 
participation in its mutual evaluation program.66  The mutual 
evaluations involved on-site assessments of compliance with the 
Recommendations, undertaken by experts drawn from other 
member nations.  The following year, FATF helped set up the 
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (“CFATF”), the first FATF-
 
 61. See generally Council of Europe, Convention on Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, E.T.S. 141, 
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/141.htm. 
 62. Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 July 1991, OJ L 166 (July 28, 1991). 
 63. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, ABOUT THE FATF, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_32236836_1_1_1_1_1,00.html, last visited 
Sept. 1, 2008 [hereinafter About the FATF]. 
 64. Id. 
 65. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, WHAT IS THE FATF?, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/document/57/0,3343,en_32250379_32235720_34432121_1_1_1_1,00.htm
l (last visited July 28, 2008) [hereinafter What is the FATF]. 
 66. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON 
MONEY LAUNDERING ANNUAL REPORT 1991–1992 (1992), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/39/35752730.pdf. 
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style regional body designed to advance adoption of the FATF 40.67  
While membership in regional bodies required a political 
commitment to implement the FATF 40 and to undergo mutual 
evaluations, no treaty obligation was involved and no timetable was 
set for implementation.68 
The FATF also worked on developing appropriate 
“countermeasures” to those jurisdictions that failed adequately to 
implement anti-money laundering policies.69  Additionally, the 
FATF expanded its membership to include twenty-four members of 
the OECD, plus Hong Kong, Singapore, and representatives of the 
European Commission and the Gulf Co-operation Council.70 
In 1996, a revised version of the 40 Recommendations was 
completed which extended AML preventive measures to non-bank 
financial institutions.71  In addition, the Asia-Pacific Group on 
Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body, was formed, and 
the mutual evaluation procedures of the CFATF and the Offshore 
Group of Banking Supervisors were assessed as being in conformity 
with the FATF’s principles.72  It also agreed to apply “preliminary 
sanctions against certain [FATF] members” that did not comply with 
the 40 Recommendations.  (Note that the word “countermeasures” 
was not used.).73  In 1997, with the creation of the Select Committee 
of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures 
(then known as the PC-R-EV), the European Council’s FATF-style 
regional body,74 such anti-money laundering regional organizations 
existed for nearly every significant financial center.75 
 
 67. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON 
MONEY LAUNDERING ANNUAL REPORT 1992–1993 5, 4 (1992), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/61/34325384.pdf. 
 68. See generally CARIBBEAN FINANCIAL TASK FORCE, CFATF: AN OVERVIEW, 
available at http://www.cfatf.org.  The “uncommitted” commitment to 
implement the FATF 40 was discussed at a number of CFTAT meetings and 
later at APF and PC-R-EV meetings, which were the former acronyms to 
describe a committee of experts on anti-money laundering.  Id. 
 69. BAHAMAS FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD, FATF COUNTER MEASURES  
FOR NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, Mar. 11, 2003, 
http://www.bfsb-bahamas.com/news_detail.lasso?id=33782. 
 70. See ABOUT THE FATF, supra note 63. 
 71. FATF 40, supra note 38, at 3. 
 72. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON 
MONEY LAUNDERING ANNUAL REPORT 1996–1997, available at 
http://www.jya.com/fatf96-97.htm. 
 73. Id. 
 74. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, MONEYVAL, WHAT ARE MONEYVAL’S 
OBJECTIVES?,http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/About/MONEYVAL
_in_brief_en.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).   
 75. This committee (now Moneyval) includes the vast majority of Eastern 
European states, in addition to the Asia/Pacific Groups on Money Laundering, 
the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, the Eastern and Southern Africa 
Anti-Money Laundering Group, the Eurasian Group, Middle East and North 
African FATF, the West African Group, and the Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering in South America.  The Wolfsberg Group of Banks, 
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During the early 1990s, FATF members expressed concern 
about jurisdictions they believed were key weak links in enforcing 
anti-money laundering rules.76  At that time many onshore 
jurisdictions, including almost all poorer or developing countries, 
had little or no enforcement of AML rules.77  However, it was the 
role played by some key offshore jurisdictions that was frequently 
mentioned as the most troublesome.78  The 1996 FATF 40 included 
FATF 21, which stated that financial institutions should give 
heightened due diligence to business relations and transactions with 
persons from jurisdictions that “do not or insufficiently apply [the] 
Recommendations.”79  Such heightened due diligence could result in 
a financial institution refusing to undertake transactions with a 
person from a non-complying jurisdiction, but the Recommendation 
was vague on this issue.80 
III. THE ADDITION OF CFT 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Treasury 
Department began immediately to push other members of the FATF 
to include terrorism financing as a central part of the organization’s 
mandate.81  On October 29th and 30th, the FATF, meeting in an 
extraordinary plenary session in Washington, adopted eight new 
recommendations on terrorist financing.82  However, that the 
financing of terrorism should be tied to anti-money laundering was, 
by no means, obvious.  While terrorism had existed before 9/11, the 
original FATF 40 made no reference to it.83  As discussed, AMLs 
were designed to stop criminals from taking criminal proceeds and 
running them through the financial system in a series of 
transactions to hide their criminal origins and/or actual ownership.  
 
Commonwealth Secretariat, and Organization of American States (CICAD) 
further buttressed the regional anti-money laundering organizations.  Id. 
 76. J.C. SHARMAN, THE GLOBAL ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGIME AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: DAMNED IF THEY DO, DAMNED IF THEY  
DON’T? 14 (working paper presented at the International Studies  
Association Annual Conference Mar. 22–25, 2006), available at 
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/0/0/7/5 
/pages100752/p100752-1.php. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. FATF 40, supra note 37, at 5. 
 80. For further discussion of this issue, see Benjamin R. Hartman, Coercing 
Cooperation from Offshore Financial Centers: Identity and Coincidence of 
International Obligations Against Money Laundering and Harmful Tax 
Competition, B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 255, 273–278 (2001), available at 
http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/meta-
elements/journals/bciclr/24_2/02_FMS.htm. 
 81. See SHARMAN, supra note 79, at 4. 
 82. HM Treasury Welcomes Tough New Measures to Tackle  
Terrorist Financing, HM TREASURY, Oct. 31, 2001, http://www.hm 
-treasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and_speeches/press/2001/press_118_01.cfm. 
 83. FATF 40, supra note 38.   
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On the other hand, terrorism financing need not involve criminal 
origins, which could be as simple as charitable donations, but rather  
a criminal destination: terrorism. 
Of course, there were some connections.  As noted, identifying 
exactly who the financial institution’s clients were was a key aspect 
of AML preventive measures.84  These measures could also be used 
to identify whether the client was a terrorist, providing of course 
that the financial institution or the authorities knew who the 
terrorists were.  This proved to be a valuable avenue for CFT 
measures. 
Even before the September 11th attacks, the United Nations 
Security Council had passed resolutions requiring all states to freeze 
accounts held by members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban and had set 
up the al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee.85  The 
committee created a consolidated list of entities and officials 
associated with these organizations as submitted by members.  
Subsequent resolutions strengthened this original commitment.86  
Resolution 1373, passed as a result of the September 11th  attacks, 
extended the requirement of states to freeze accounts to terrorists 
other than al-Qaeda and the Taliban.87  The UN General Assembly 
had also adopted a UN Convention on suppression of terrorism 
financing, although it did not go into force until April of 2002.88  The 
convention requires contracting states to take appropriate measures 
“for the identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds 
used or allocated for the purpose of committing [terrorist offenses as 
defined in the convention as well as the proceeds derived from such 
offences, for purposes of possible forfeiture.”89  Assuming that 
 
 84. See WOLFSBERG AML PRINCIPLES, supra note 46. 
 85. S.C. Res. 1267, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999), available 
at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/. 
 86. Id. (including links to the relevant Security Council Resolutions). 
 87. S.C. Res. 1373, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001), 
available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF 
/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement. 
 88. Ctr. for Nonproliferation Studies, International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, available at 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/finterr.pdf. 
 89. G.A. Res. 109, art. 8, U.N. Doc. A.54/49 (Dec. 9, 1999), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/financingterrorism.html. The Treaty 
defined terrorism as acts described in any treaty in the Annex, and “[a]ny other 
act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other 
person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate 
a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do 
or to abstain from doing any act.”  Id. at art. 2(1)(b).  The treaties listed in the 
Annex include unlawful seizure of aircraft,  unlawful acts against the safety of 
civil aviation, crimes against internationally protected persons (including 
diplomatic agents), the taking of hostages, the unlawful acquisition or threat to 
nuclear material, unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international 
civil aviation and against the safety of civil aviation, unlawful acts against the 
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someone could come up with a list of possible terrorists, financial 
institutions could compare that list to their account holders to see if 
there was a match, much as they could now do with known 
criminals. 
The first Special Recommendation of the convention requires 
each jurisdiction to take immediate steps to ratify and to implement 
fully the 1999 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism and to implement the Security Council resolutions 
relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of 
terrorist acts, particularly UN Security Council Resolution 1373.90  
Special Recommendation III specifically requires that each 
jurisdiction freeze funds or other assets of terrorists, those who 
finance terrorism, and terrorist organizations, according to UN 
resolutions and generally.91  Special Recommendation II requires 
each jurisdiction to criminalize the financing of terrorism, terrorist 
acts, and terrorist organizations, and to ensure that such offenses 
are designated as money-laundering predicate offenses.92  In other 
words, knowingly laundering any proceeds from terrorism would 
constitute the crime of money laundering, although one would 
normally expect that the vast majority of jurisdictions would view 
terrorism as a serious crime and therefore already a predicate 
offense to money laundering.93 
The proposed regime certainly could generate problems with 
respect to implementation.  First, maintaining an up-to-date list of 
known terrorists could be difficult, even if the final list applicable to 
domestic financial institutions was to be undertaken by a domestic 
governmental authority.  Certainly errors can arise in putting 
together the list at both an international and a local level, and even 
a brief freezing of a person’s bank account can cause serious 
damage.94  Next, there may be many people or organizations with 
 
safety of maritime navigation, unlawful acts against the safety of fixed 
platforms located on the continental shelf, and terrorist bombings.  Id. at 
Annex; see also G.A. Res. 164, art. 2(1), U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess. (May 23, 2001) 
(defining terrorist bombings as the bombings of state or government facilities, 
forms of public transportation, or other aspects of the public infrastructure).  
With certain limited exceptions in each convention, the terrorists must be 
nationals of a different state than the state in which the terrorist act took place. 
 90. FATF SPECIAL IX, supra note 38, at 1. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. It was discussed at the time that some countries,  for example, the 
United States, that use a specific list of offenses as predicates for the crime of 
money laundering (rather than something more general like “all serious 
crimes”) might not have thought to include terrorism.  CHARLES DOYLE, 
CRIMINAL MONEY LAUNDERING LEGISLATION IN THE 109TH CONGRESS (2006), 
available at http://www.house.gov/gallegly/issues/crime/crimedocs/RS22400.pdf. 
 94. Also, procedures for removal from the U.S. Sanction’s Monitoring 
Committee list can be problematic.  See Nicole Nice-Petersen, Justice for the 
“Designated”: The Process That is Due to Alleged U.S. Financiers of Terrorism, 
93 GEO. L.J. 1387, 1406–09 (2005); Jennifer R. White, IEEPA’s Override 
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the same name; it may be hard for financial institutions to ensure 
that their procedures identify the correct persons, legal or physical.  
Other problems could arise for financial institutions depending on 
how the general recommendations were to be translated into rules 
in domestic legislation, rules that will be discussed infra.  However, 
in general at least, these rules, which one attendee at the Special 
Meeting referred to as the “Christmas Rules” (“He’s making a list/ 
Checking it twice/ Gonna find out/ Who’s naughty and nice”),95 were 
relatively straightforward.96 
However, the proposed new CFT regime required more.  
Financial institutions were already required to profile clients and 
monitor their transactions to see if the proceeds of crime or money 
laundering were involved and, if appropriate, to report a suspicious 
transaction to the government.  Then, perhaps, the financial 
institution could also profile clients and monitor transactions to see 
if they might have some involvement in the financing of terrorism 
and report those cases as well.  This is exactly what new Special 
Recommendation IV did when it required that financial institutions 
extend suspicious transaction/activity-reporting requirements to 
terrorism financing.97 
Interestingly, a question arose at the FATF Special Meeting as 
to why only the financing of terrorism should be included, rather 
than the financing of other serious crimes.  One participant in the 
FATF meeting noted that “under the proposed rule, if I plan to use 
my bank account to buy bullets to kill my wife the bank need not 
care, but if I plan to use the account to buy bullets to threaten a 
local politician they need to report me.”98 
The FATF Special meeting added three other specific Special 
Recommendations of interest to financial institutions.  They were: 
Special Recommendation VI, which required alternative remittance 
systems (i.e. those that are not part of the regulated financial 
 
Authority: Potential for a Violation of the Geneva Convention’s Right to Access 
for Humanitarian Organizations?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 2019, 2024–26 (2006). 
 95. J. FRED COOTS & HENRY GILLESPIE, SANTA CLAUS IS COMING TO TOWN 
(1934), available at http://www.the-north-pole.com/carols/santacome.html. 
 96. For an overview of the work and procedure of the 1267 Committee, see 
Eric Rosand, The Security Council’s Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of Al 
Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions, 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 745, 747–753 (2004).  The author 
rightly emphasized the “delicate balance that needs to be struck between 
having an expedited listing process to ensure that legitimate targets do not 
escape sanctions, and putting minimum evidentiary standards and a 
transparent listing process into place to ensure that due process and other 
human rights standards are respected.”  Id. at 750; see also BARDO FASSBENDER, 
TARGETED SANCTIONS AND DUE PROCESS, STUDY COMMISSIONED BY THE UNITED 
NATIONS OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS (2006), available at 
http://www.un.org/law/counsel/Fassbender_study.pdf (discussing concerns over 
due process rights over specific targeted sanctions). 
 97. See FATF SPECIAL IX, supra note 38. 
 98. See G.A. Res. 109, supra note 89. 
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system) to be brought into the regulatory system;99 Special 
Recommendation VII,100 which provided new rules on information 
transmitted with funds transfers; and Special Recommendation 
VIII,101 which noted that charities can be particularly vulnerable to 
terrorism financing and required countries to ensure that charities 
are not so misused, an observation based primarily on a number of 
prosecutions brought by law enforcement where primarily Islamic 
charities had appeared to finance terrorists. 
Special Recommendation VIII was not specifically directed to 
financial institutions.  Rather, it required that governments review 
rules to ensure that nonprofits were not being “misused” by terrorist 
organizations posing as legitimate entities and that they “ensure” 
that nonprofits were not being used for clandestine diversion of 
funds.102  In other words, Special Recommendation VIII had nothing 
specifically to do with the financial system: It looked as if it had 
primarily to do with the regulation of charities, similar to the 
example discussed earlier in this Article.  But Special 
Recommendation VIII did suggest that charities may be among the 
more likely terrorism-financing culprits.103  For this reason, it could 
be that financial institutions should focus at least some of their 
suspicious-activity monitoring on this type of client, as they already 
did for politicians.  However, if in fact most charities made 
payments directly to other charities without following particular 
patterns that suggested a heightened risk of terrorism financing, 
then it would be difficult for financial institutions to determine 
when a transaction was actually suspicious and when to file a SAR 
with a government agency. 
IV. DETAILS ON THE GLOBAL AML/CFT STANDARD 
In order to understand the magnitude of the task devolved by 
the FATF Special Meeting on financial institutions,104 it is necessary 
to take a more detailed look at the preventive measures briefly 
outlined above and how they are implemented in practice. 
As noted earlier, before the adoption of the Special 
Recommendations in 2001, the FATF 40 established a process or 
strategy through which financial institutions and government 
authorities would play a role in identifying proceeds of crime.105  In 
 
 99. See FATF SPECIAL IX, supra note 38, at 2. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERPRETATIVE NOTE TO SPECIAL 
RECOMMENDATION VIII: NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/5/38816530.pdf. 
 104. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  Following adoption of 
Special Recommendation VIII by the FATF, the recommendations became part 
of the international standard.  Id. 
 105. Id. 
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essence, financial institutions are required to identify clients, create 
client profiles, monitor transactions, and report suspicious activity 
to government authorities, who then identify cases from those 
reports for further investigation, and, if necessary, issue orders for 
freezing the suspected proceeds of crime.  Within this overall 
strategy, financial institutions are tasked specifically with 
implementing systems to detect suspicious or unusual transactions 
or funds, examining them, and reporting those they suspect are 
results of the proceeds of crime.106  This Article refers to this 
requirement as the “detection, examination, and reporting system.” 
Key to this overall strategy are the Financial Intelligence Units 
(“FIUs”), a role played in the United States by FinCEN, noted 
earlier in the discussion of the Spitzer case.  FinCEN serves as a 
national center for receiving, analyzing, and disseminating SARs, 
along with other information regarding potential money laundering 
(and now terrorism financing).107  The FIU should also have access 
to other financial, administrative, and law enforcement information 
so that it can analyze SARs.108  Actually, FinCEN operates slightly 
differently than the FIUs of most other countries in that it 
disseminates essentially all SARs to law enforcement authorities, 
who then conduct investigations with the assistance of FinCEN.109 
The FIU and other authorities that investigate possible crimes 
are tasked with identifying what they believe actually are criminal 
proceeds, that is, with the level of certainty required by the domestic 
justice systems for asset seizure/confiscation/criminal prosecution, 
along with supporting evidence.110  This second, or criminal 
investigation system, may build on information provided by the 
detection, examination, and reporting systems, but extends far 
beyond it. 
In effect, the combined strategy outsources some aspects of law 
enforcement from the criminal investigation system to financial 
institutions,111  turning financial institutions into (unpaid) agents of 
 
 106. FATF 40, supra note 38, at 6, 27. 
 107. FINCEN, WHAT WE DO, http://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd 
/index.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2008) [hereinafter WHAT WE DO]. 
 108. See FATF 40, supra note 38, at 8. 
 109. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 44, at 60; see also WHAT WE 
DO, supra note 107. 
 110. Depending on the jurisdiction, different levels of proof may be required 
for confiscation of criminal proceeds and for conviction of persons for the crime 
of money laundering.  Temporary or provisional measures such as freezing or 
seizing assets typically do not require full judicial process.  INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, MEXICO: REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS AND 
CODES—FATF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND 
COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM (2005), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05436.pdf. 
 111. Such outsourcing is described by some authors as “horizontal 
subsidiarity.”  See, e.g., WOLFGANG H. REINICKE, GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY: 
GOVERNING WITHOUT GOVERNMENT 89–90 (1998) (discussing issues related to 
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the criminal justice system. 
V. DETECTION, EXAMINATION, AND REPORTING  SYSTEM 
FATF Recommendations 5, 11, and 13 (and the accompanying 
relevant materials in the accompanying “Methodology” for 
assessment of compliance) set out the detection, examination, and 
reporting systems for financial institutions.112  These consist of 
requirements for customer due diligence, including customer 
identification (FATF 5), customer transaction monitoring (first part 
of FATF 11), transaction examination (second part of FATF 11), and 
suspicious transaction reporting (FATF 13).113 
FATF 5 requires that financial institutions identify their 
customers, including the beneficial owner of a customer account, 
which, in the case of legal persons (and other legal arrangements 
such as trusts), includes taking “reasonable measures” to identify 
the physical persons who own or control the customer.114  The 
methodology allows an exception from this latter requirement in the 
event the legal person is a public company.115  Financial institutions 
must also understand the purpose, intended relationship, and 
conduct with the customer, and undergo ongoing customer due 
diligence (as HSBC failed to do with respect to QAT International 
and QAT Consulting Group) in the business relationship, and 
“scrutiny of transactions undertaken through the course of the 
relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are 
consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, its 
business and risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of 
funds.”116  In the event the financial institution cannot comply, it 
should terminate business relations or not undertake a transaction 
and should “consider” filing a SAR.117 
The United States complies with these requirements through 
statutory and regulatory measures,118 as well as through guidance 
 
assigning public-sector tasks to private-sector actors). 
 112. See FATF 40, supra note 38, at 2–3, 5. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 2–3. 
 115. FATF METHODOLOGY, supra note 38, at 13. 
 116. FATF 40, supra note 38, at 3. 
 117. Id. at 3. 
 118. There have been customer identification rules in effect for banks and 
similar financial institutions in the U.S. since 1983.  See MUTUAL EVALUATION 
REPORT, supra note 37, at 95–96; M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CRS REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS: INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND ANTI-TERRORIST 
FINANCING ACT OF 2001, TITLE III OF PUB. L. NO. 107-56, 2–4 (2001), available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/financial/RL31208.pdf.  Title III of the Patriot Act of 
2001, entitled “International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-terrorist 
Financing Act of 2001,” updated and enhanced these measures by adding 
several new provisions to the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”).  31 U.S.C. § 5311 
(2001).  Section 326 of the Act provides for the Secretary of the Treasury to 
promulgate regulations on customer identification, and requires financial 
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outlined in materials used by supervisors in their examinations of 
financial institutions and compliance with statutory and regulatory 
provisions. The most recent of these is the Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-
Money Laundering Examination Manual,119 which applies to 
financial institutions that are banks or bank-like institutions,120 and 
where guidance on customer identification121 and on transaction 
monitoring are spelled out in greater detail.122 
FATF 5 also allows financial institutions to determine the 
“extent of such measures on a risk-sensitive basis, depending on the 
type of customer, business relationship or transaction,” with higher 
risk categories requiring enhanced due diligence.123  The 
methodology goes on to provide certain examples of higher risk 
categories,124 which include non-resident customers, private 
banking, and legal persons or arrangements that are personal-asset 
holding vehicles, such as QAT International and QAT Consulting 
Group.125  FATF 6 goes further and requires that financial 
 
institutions to implement reasonable procedures for (1) verifying the identity of 
any person seeking to open an account, to the extent reasonable and 
practicable; (2) maintaining records of the information used to verify the 
person’s identity, including name, address, and other identifying information; 
and (3) determining whether the person appears on any lists of known or 
suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations provided to the financial 
institution by any government agency.  The final regulations on customer 
identification are found in 31 C.F.R. § 103.121 (2007).  31 U.S.C. § 5314(h) 
authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to require financial institutions to 
report suspicious transactions.  It is implemented at 21 C.F.R. § 21.11.  There 
are similar customer identification rules for securities broker-dealers, mutual 
funds, and futures commission merchants and introducing brokers in 
commodities.  31 CFR § 103.122 (2007); 31 CFR § 103.131 (2007); see also ASD 
Notice to Members 02-21, pages 5–7 (2002); NASD Notice to Members 03-34 
(2003).  Under 31 CFR § 103.137(c) (2007), a life insurer is required to have 
policies and procedures for obtaining “all relevant customer-related information 
necessary for an effective anti-money laundering program.” 
 119. FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY 
ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL (2006), available at  
http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/bsa_aml_examination_manual2006.pdf [hereinafter 
FFIEC MANUAL]. 
 120. This refers to those financial institutions supervised and examined by 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision.  The 
Manual also used by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, the American 
Council of State Savings Supervisors, and the National Association of State 
Credit Union Supervisors.  See FFIEC, ABOUT THE FFIEC, 
http://www.ffiec.gov/about.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2008).   
 121. See FFIEC MANUAL, supra note 119, at 18–34, 45–59, 120–25, 265–68. 
 122. Id. at 60–76, 149–60, F1–F9, L1–L2. 
 123. FATF 40, supra note 38, at 2. 
 124. These are derived from the BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 
CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE FOR BANKS 6 (2001), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85.pdf.  
 125. FATF METHODOLOGY, supra note 37, at 14. 
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institutions have risk management systems to determine if 
customers are politically-exposed persons, defined as individuals 
who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions in a 
foreign country (although countries are encouraged to extend this to 
domestic officials), as well as (in effect) family members or “close 
associates” of politically-exposed persons.126  The recommendation 
further requires that financial institutions take reasonable 
measures to establish the “source of wealth and source of funds” and 
conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business 
relationship.127  The United States has put in place similar rules.128  
In particular, while United States guidance documents require 
financial institutions to undertake heightened due diligence when 
clients are politically exposed persons, this group only includes 
“foreign” persons.129  Eliot Spitzer would not be a politically exposed 
person under this standard. 
FATF 11 requires that financial institutions pay “special” 
attention to complex and unusually large or unusual patterns of 
transactions with no “apparent” economic or visible lawful purpose, 
examine “as far as possible” the background and purpose of such 
transactions, and establish “the findings” in writing.130  
Interestingly, this requirement is separate from Recommendation 
5(c)’s requirement for ongoing customer due diligence with respect 
to “scrutiny of transactions.”131  FATF 13 requires that a financial 
institution report promptly to the financial intelligence unit if it 
suspects, or has reasonable grounds to suspect, that funds are the 
proceeds of a criminal activity, which the methodology further 
defines as filing a SAR.132  Again, U.S. rules comply with these 
requirements.133 
With the exception of the addition of the reference to risk-based 
systems (including politically exposed persons), the customer due 
diligence and transaction monitoring and suspicious transaction 
reporting requirements in the FATF Preventive Measures differ 
little from those in the previous version adopted in 1996.  Although 
the three recommendations (and their counterparts in U.S. rules) do 
not say so explicitly or in so many words, they form a system134 
 
 126. Id. at 81. 
 127. FATF 40, supra note 38, at 3–4. 
 128. The United States has adopted a risk-based system.  See, e.g., FFIEC 
MANUAL, supra note 119, at 11–27, I-1, K-1, M-1 to -2. 
 129. Id. at 21, 118–22, 261–64.  Section 312 of the U.S. Patriot Act requires 
institutions to establish special due-diligence procedures with respect to private 
banking accounts held by, or on behalf of, a non-U.S. person.  Id. 
 130. FATF 40, supra note 38, at 5. 
 131. Id. at 3. 
 132. Id. at 5. 
 133. 31 CFR § 103.18 to .19 (2007) (setting forth U.S. rules on investigation 
and reporting). 
 134. A working group consisting of the Commonwealth Secretariat, the 
UNODCP, the World Bank, and the IMF has been engaged in drafting a model 
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whereby financial institutions must (1) identify customers (and the 
beneficial owner if different); (2) establish and maintain an up-to-
date customer profile;135 (3) monitor transactions to see if they fit 
with the customer profile; (4) if not, examine the transaction to see if 
it might represent the proceeds of crime, including by examining the 
source of funds; and (5) if so, report the transaction to the financial 
intelligence unit (along with a description of why the financial 
institution believes that the transaction is suspicious). 
In implementing these five steps, financial institutions may use 
a risk-based system (in the United States they must use such a 
system) applying enhanced customer due diligence to higher risk 
customers and reduced customer due diligence to lower risk 
customers.136 
However, the recommendations do not give guidance as to 
exactly how far, and with what criteria, financial institutions should 
go in implementing Steps 1 through 4 above, and when they should 
file a SAR under Step 5.  And, although there are many places 
within the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
(“FFIEC”) Manual where helpful “flags” are given as to what would 
constitute a possible need for heightened scrutiny,137 there is no 
guidance there either as to exactly how far, and using what criteria, 
financial institutions should go. 
As one can readily imagine, this creates a serious problem for 
implementation.  Suspicious transactions will nearly always have 
relatively different risk rankings ( i.e. the degrees of likelihood that 
criminal proceeds are involved), and suspicious transactions will 
tend to differ with respect to the total amount of criminal proceeds 
involved.  In short, the FATF Preventive Measures do not describe 
 
regulation for the prevention of money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism (“Model Regulation”).  The most recent draft of the Model Regulation 
implements, inter alia, FATF 4 through 2, and is based on the regulatory 
frameworks in the UK, Canada, Australia, Hong Kong SAR, and a number of 
other Commonwealth countries.  Article 5.1(a-e) of the Model Regulation 
outlines CDD as the “(a) identification of customers, including beneficial 
owners; (b) gathering of information on customers to create a customer profile; 
(c) application of acceptance policies to new customers; (d) maintenance of 
customer information on an ongoing basis; [and the] (e) monitoring of customer 
transactions.”  Model Regulation (2006) (on file with Financial Market 
Integrity, the World Bank).  Article 10 describes a customer profile as being “of 
sufficient nature and detail . . . to monitor the customer’s transactions, apply 
enhanced customer due diligence where necessary, and detect suspicious 
transactions.”  Id. 
 135. Presumably, if the customer profile suggests that proceeds of crime are 
involved, the financial institution should go directly to Step 4. 
 136. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH 
TO COMBATING  
MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING 2, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/46/38960576.pdf [hereinafter FATF 
GUIDANCE]. 
 137. See, e.g., FFIEC MANUAL, supra note 119, at 61. 
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with any precision at what point on the risk continuum financial 
institutions should identify suspicious transactions (i.e., the 
continuum stretching from all transactions about which a financial 
institution may have any suspicion at all to those for which financial 
institutions have a very strong suspicion). 
Also, the FATF Preventive Measures do not provide guidance as 
to whether financial institutions should consider all transactions 
equally, regardless of the size of the suspected criminal proceeds, or 
whether they should focus on transactions with relatively larger 
amounts of suspected criminal proceeds.  The wording of the 
recommendations themselves includes a number of terms that are 
not easily defined in practice and therefore add significantly to the 
problem.  For example, what are “reasonable measures” when it 
comes to identifying a beneficial owner/controller?  How detailed 
must a “risk profile” be, and when will it be “necessary” to identify 
the source of funds?  With respect to politically exposed persons, 
what are “reasonable measures” to establish the source of wealth 
and source of funds, and what constitutes “enhanced” monitoring?  
What does it mean to examine “as far as possible” the “background” 
and “purpose” of unusual transactions?  Again, there is little help in 
the FFIEC Manual. 
VI. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION SYSTEM 
Even with its shortcomings, the discussion in the FATF 40 of 
the detection, examination, and reporting system is considerably 
more developed than that of the criminal investigations system.  
While many of the Recommendations discuss the tools that should 
be available for investigations, there is very little discussion of 
exactly what the FIUs or investigating authorities should do.  The 
FATF 26 states only that an FIU should be a “national centre for 
receiving (and as permitted, requesting), analysis, and 
dissemination of a suspicious activity/transaction report and other 
information regarding money laundering or terrorist financing.”138  
FinCEN appears to have insufficient direction as to its exact role in 
the detection, examination, and reporting system, much like the 
insufficient direction as to where the role of financial institutions 
should end and FinCEN and government investigators should 
begin.139 
A. Development and Implementation of Preventive Measures 
Under the FATF Preventive Measures, financial institutions 
 
 138. The methodology goes on to reference the Egmont Group Statement of 
Purpose, which adds little to what is found in Recommendation 26 and does not 
discuss what “analysis” means or how the financial institution’s detection and 
reporting of a suspicious transaction differ from a FIU’s “analysis” of the 
transaction.  FATF 40, supra note 38, at 8. 
 139. See MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 44, at 60–67. 
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must develop (and implement) their own systems to carry out their 
detection, examination, and reporting requirements.140  As part of 
the five basic steps of the detection, examination, and reporting 
system, financial institutions need to develop ways of identifying 
types of customers and types of transactions that, in addition to 
being “unusual,” indicate a higher risk for the generation of criminal 
proceeds.141  Financial institutions must develop systems that they 
believe will bear fruit in identifying transactions that are more 
likely to suggest criminal proceeds than others.  However, the 
principle business of financial institutions is not criminal law 
enforcement.  There are a number of ways that financial institutions 
try to fulfill their obligations in this regard. 
B. Methods, Trends, and Typologies 
Money laundering methods, trends, and typologies have 
emerged as key tools for financial institutions to implement their 
AML duties under the FATF Recommendations.  At least in theory, 
typologies describe typical tactics used by launderers or patterns 
that indicate a higher risk of laundering.  Special typologies are 
often described for different categories of criminals or types of 
criminal proceeds.  Typologies (and other guidance with respect to 
identifying laundering) are produced and published by the FATF, 
FATF-Style Regional Bodies (“FSRBs”)142 and national competent 
authorities, especially FIUs.  While these typologies and other 
information provide some guidance, according to surveys of financial 
institutions, they believe the information provided to be extremely 
general and therefore of little use in identifying transactions that 
are of a materially higher risk than other transactions.  Therefore, 
the recommendations do not provide sufficient assistance to 
financial institutions designing and implementing their risk-based 
preventive measures requirements.143  As the European Commission 
 
 140. See, e.g., FATF 40, supra note 38, at 8. 
 141. FATF GUIDANCE, supra note 136, at 3. 
 142. See, e.g., FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF METHODS & TRENDS, 
available at 
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_32237277_1_1_1_1_1,00.html; 
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON MONEY LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES 
2003-2004, 19–23, available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/19/11/33624379.pdf (discussing Politically Exposes Persons 
(“PEPs”)); FINANCIAL ACTION  TASK FORCE, REPORT ON MONEY LAUNDERING 
TYPOLOGIES 2001-2002, 12–14, available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/29/35/34038006.pdf (discussing corruption and private 
banking). 
 143. MATTHEW H. FLEMING, UK LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY USE AND 
MANAGEMENT OF SARS: TOWARDS DETERMINING  
THE VALUE OF THE REGIME 55, 59–60 (2005), available at 
http://www.jdi.ucl.ac.uk/downloads/publications/research_reports/Fleming_LEA
_Use_and_Mgmt_of_SARs_June2005.pdf (noting that there is a perception 
among financial institutions in Australia, the U.S., the U.K., France, and other 
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noted, the AML and CFT systems can only work if (among other 
things) financial institutions have expertise to carry out the first 
risk analysis.144 
C. Feedback from Financial Intelligence Units and Other 
Government Agencies 
These problems are seriously compounded because of the 
critical lack of feedback from FIUs (or other parts of the criminal 
investigations system) to financial institutions as to any aspect of 
the SAR systems.  As discussed above, financial institutions rely on 
money laundering typologies to help design their AML systems.  
However, except in very rare cases, financial institutions report that 
they are not told if a SAR has resulted in a real positive, let alone 
what aspects of the report were useful to the FIU (or other part of 
the criminal investigations system) in identifying criminals or 
criminal proceeds.145  Without such information, financial 
institutions can only guess to what degree they are successful in 
identifying suspicious transactions. 
D. Costs 
While public sector investigative duties are normally financed 
through general revenues, financial institutions’ detection, 
examination, and reporting duties must normally be financed by 
increasing prices the institutions charge clients, reducing net 
profits, or (most probably) a mix of the two.  Higher financial 
institution prices can have significant and adverse public policy 
effects, such as decreasing access to financial services by low income 
clients.146  Reports suggest that financial institution costs in 
implementing preventive measures have been increasing 
significantly.147 
 
OECD countries that there is little useful information provided by domestic 
financial intelligence units to financial institutions, especially with respect to 
identifying typologies, including new money laundering techniques, trends 
within existing techniques, and the relative identification of  more prominent 
typologies). 
 144. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL JUSTICE FREEDOM AND 
SECURITY, FINAL REPORT 30 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice 
_home/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/report_01_02_07_with_appendix_en.pdf. 
 145. See, e.g., id. at 53 (indicating that financial institutions want to know 
which suspicious activity/transaction reports were helpful and why). 
 146. See generally JENNIFER ISERN & DAVID PORTEOUS, AML/CFT 
REGULATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS THAT SERVE LOW-
INCOME PEOPLE (2005) (discussing, inter alia, how increased costs due to 
implementation of AML/CFT regulations may reduce the supply of affordable 
financial services to low-income persons). 
 147. Alan E. Sorcher, Lost in Implementation: Financial Institutions Face 
Challenges Complying with Anti-Money Laundering Laws, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. 
395, 396 (2005) (noting that banks have significantly increased their spending 
on AML/CFT procedures); KPMG INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL ANTI-MONEY 
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Also, assuming that increasingly onerous detection, 
examination, and reporting duties are likely to increase financial 
institutions’ marginal costs, a conflict of interest arises between the 
financial institution as the “agent” and the criminal investigations 
system as the “principal.”  While FATF 40 does not suggest that 
financial institutions should be compensated for implementing their 
agency duties, FATF 23 states that jurisdictions must require 
financial institutions to implement their detection, examination, and 
reporting duties through their regular prudential processes with 
attendant supervisory sanctions applied in the event of a breach.148 
VII. THE CURRENT SITUATION 
Exactly how such a system of incentives is implemented has a 
significant effect on results.  From the perspective of financial 
institutions, these requirements are very serious, even if they are 
not well spelled out.  FATF 17 requires the imposition of “effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions” to deal with natural or legal 
persons who fail to comply with anti-money laundering or terrorist-
financing requirements.149  FATF 29 specifically states that 
supervisors of financial institutions “should have adequate powers 
to monitor and ensure compliance by financial institutions with 
requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing . . .”150  United States laws comply,151 and significant fines, 
as well as other supervisory and regulatory orders against financial 
institutions, have resulted.152 
 
LAUNDERING SURVEY 2004: HOW BANKS ARE FACING UP TO THE CHALLENGE 11 
(2004), available at 
http://www.us.kpmg.com/microsite/FSLibraryDotCom/docs/AML%20A4_web%2
017%20Sept.pdf. 
 148. Under FATF 1 and 2, a financial institution’s extensive failure to 
implement its detection, examination, and reporting duties could result in a 
charge with the crime of money laundering itself.  FATF 40, supra note 37, at 
1–2.  Financial institutions will have a financial incentive to reduce their 
detection, examination, and reporting costs through a reduction in detection, 
examination, and reporting duties up to the point of the cost of sanctions (which 
will include not only monetary sanctions but the cost of any resulting adverse 
effect on reputation).  On the other hand, the criminal investigations system 
will have an incentive to require their agent financial institutions to carry as 
great a detection, examination, and reporting burden as is allowed by the 
enforcement system.  Id. 
 149. FATF 40, supra note 37, at 6. 
 150. Id. at 9. 
 151. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 44, at 164–90. 
 152. See, e.g., U.S. Cease and Desist Order and Order of Assessment of a 
Civil Money Penalty, In the Matter of American Express Bank  
International, No. 07-017-B-EC (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Syst.  
Aug. 6, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement 
/enf20070806a1.pdf; U.S. Assessment of Civil Money Penalty, In the Matter of 
Union Bank of California No. 2007–02 (Dep’t of Treasury 2007), available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/files/ASSESSMENT_In_the_Matter_of 
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In addition to other possibly adverse effects, if a financial 
institution is usually sanctioned only for failure to report suspicious 
transactions (false negatives) and not for reporting too many that do 
not turn out to be suspicious (false positives), there will be an 
incentive for financial institutions to apply too little scrutiny and to 
over-report.153  Currently, in many key jurisdictions, there have 
been considerable increases in SAR reporting, even though costs, as 
noted above, have also increased.154  Although detailed information 
from the criminal investigations system is difficult to find, a review 
of reports on assessments of compliance with the FATF standards 
completed by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”), FATF and FSRBs since the adoption of the Bank/Fund 
AML/CFT Pilot Assessment Program suggests that, at best, only a 
very small fraction of SARs filed with financial institutions 
represent actual positives.  The result has been a general flooding of 
FIUs with essentially “defensive” suspicious activity/transaction 
reporting, which generates information overload and generally clogs 
the criminal investigations system with too many false positives.155  
A key improvement to the system as it now operates would be a 
significant reduction in false positives, though without a 
corresponding increase in false negatives.156  The huge increase in 
suspicious activity/transaction reporting by financial institutions in 
the United States confirms this larger trend.157 
In sum, FATF preventive measures do not specify key aspects of 
financial institutions’ responsibilities in identifying and reporting 
 
_Union_Bank_of_California.pdf; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S.A.  
Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (D.P.R. 2003), available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/files/bancopopular.pdf. 
 153. See generally Elod Takats, A Theory of ‘Crying Wolf’: The Economics of 
Money Laundering Enforcement 4 (International Monetary Fund  
Working Paper No. 07/81, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=979035 (laying out a theoretical argument for 
increasing filings of defense suspicious-activity reports by reporting 
institutions). 
 154. See generally STEPHEN LANDER, SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIMES AGENCY, 
REVIEW OF THE SARS REGIME 13 (2006), available at 
http://www.soca.gov.uk/downloads/SOCAtheSARsReview_FINAL_Web.pdf 
(discussing increases in STR reporting); Michael Levi & Peter Reuter, Money 
Laundering, 34 CRIME & JUST. 289 (2006).  Of course, if a financial institution is 
sanctioned for reporting too many false positives, there will be a disincentive to 
report and a possible increase in false negatives. 
 155. See LANDER, supra note 154; Levi & Reuter, supra note 162, at 313; 
FLEMING, supra note 143, at 10, 35, 36. 
 156. See REUTER, supra note 52, at 94, 101–02 (discussing benefits of 
reducing false positives). 
 157. This conclusion is supported by specific studies of the United States 
and the United Kingdom.  See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Criminal Law: The 
Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money Laundering and the 
Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 396 (2003) 
(describing increases in SARing in the United States); LANDER, supra note 154, 
at 25. 
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suspicious transactions, including how many resources they should 
resort to in identifying the bona fides of payment origins or of 
owners and controllers of accounts, how much scrutiny should be 
applied to transactions, and how many false positives and false 
negatives are reasonable.  The more effort financial institutions put 
into such activities, the more costly it is (with serious potential 
downsides for consumers of financial institution services).  And, 
while over-reporting creates serious problems for the criminal 
investigations system, it seems to be the norm.158  Nevertheless, the 
criminal investigations system gives little help to financial 
institutions by failing to proide detailed typologies or feedback as to 
the usefulness of SARs reported, which could be used by the 
financial institutions to reduce over-reporting.  It would be of 
considerable help to financial institutions in implementing their 
detection, examination, and reporting requirements if these issues 
could be resolved.  But apparently they have not been, at least not 
adequately. 
Eliot Spitzer was caught up in the preventive measures net, 
even though he was not engaged in money laundering.  While one 
must speculate a bit, it seems that his use of what appeared to be 
basic, run-of-the-mill money laundering techniques such as 
structuring and trying to hide his identity were enough to bring his 
transactions to the attention of his bank.159  The fact that he was a 
politician (and perhaps one not well-liked by his particular bank) 
may have been enough for the bank simply to send along a SAR 
without much additional investigation as to whether money 
laundering might be involved.  The same can be said for the 
Emperors Club, since the bank sent in a SAR simply because the 
club was using companies that apparently had no economic purpose 
other than to disguise their beneficial owner/controller.160  An 
attentive IRS agent probably recognized the Governor’s name and 
started an investigation, even though money laundering was not 
likely. 
As noted earlier, even a cursory investigation by the bank would 
have revealed that Spitzer was making payments and not receiving 
them and that he was not in control of the ultimate recipients of the 
payments.  But the bank did not need to spend additional resources 
to conduct an additional investigation as it could simply file a SAR 
and avoid further sanctions.  Apparently this is what it did. 
VIII. TERRORISM FINANCING 
While the problem that the above system creates for financial 
 
 158. Stephen Stead, AntiMoney Laundering Compliance vs. Detection, 
CREDIT CONTROL J., http://www.creditcontrol.co.uk/features/legalaspects 
/00002.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2008).   
 159. See Sandman, supra note 10. 
 160. See Van Natta & Becker, supra note 14. 
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institutions (and for government authorities) is clear enough with 
respect to financial institutions’ monitoring of client accounts and 
reporting when they suspect proceeds of crime or money laundering, 
it is far more difficult when it comes to suspecting that terrorism 
financing is involved.  When the FATF first published its 40 
Recommendations, financial institutions in most FATF member 
countries were in the process of implementing a detection, 
examination, and reporting system for criminal proceeds similar to 
the one required by the FATF 40’s preventive measures.  But when 
the detection, examination, and reporting system for terrorism 
financing was established, neither financial institutions nor their 
supervisors had much, if any, relevant experience.  While they had 
not originally been in the business of finding criminal proceeds, at 
least financial institutions had years of learning how to do so, as 
well as at least some guidance from international organizations like 
the FATF and local law enforcement to help them.  While financial 
institutions appear to over-report transactions and actually find few 
criminals, at least they had some idea of what they were supposed to 
do. 
Soon after the FATF adopted the Special Recommendation IX 
(and soon after the United States adopted similar requirements), the 
FATF Secretariat published a commentary entitled Guidance for 
Financial Institutions in Detecting Terrorist Financing.161  It was 
not a promising start.  It stated flatly that “[i]t should be 
acknowledged that financial institutions will probably be unable to 
detect terrorist financing as such.”162  The paper went on to discuss 
that the source of terrorism financing is often crime and may 
therefore be covered already by existing AML detection 
techniques.163  Even the report’s list of “locations of concern” (i.e. 
places where transactions should raise heightened scrutiny), were 
largely the same as those listed in FATF 21: countries that did not 
comply with FATF 40.164  While there was mention of charities as 
being of concern, there was no attempt to tie these concerns to any 
special type of charity or charity sending payments to locations 
known to have terrorism concerns. 
Of course, if jurisdictions were all following the dictates of 
Special Recommendation VI and ensuring that nonprofits and 
charities were not being used by terrorists, financial institutions 
would not have a problem.  It would be the job of governments to 
identify and shut down charities compromised by terrorists, or at 
 
 161. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, GUIDANCE FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
IN DETECTING  
TERRORIST FINANCING (2002), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/39 
/21/34033955.pdf. 
 162. Id. at 3. 
 163. Id. at 7–8. 
 164. Id. at 9–10. 
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least to place them on a list for financial institutions to check once, 
if not twice. 
Although the United States was the principal country behind 
the FATF’s adoption of the anti-money laundering detection, 
examination, and reporting system for terrorism financing, the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States’ 
Staff Report on Terrorist Financing, published two years after the 
adoption of Special Recommendation IV, concluded that: 
[F]inancial institutions can be most useful in the fight against 
terrorist financing by collecting accurate information about 
their customers and providing this information—pursuant to 
legal process—to aid in terrorism investigations.  However, the 
requirement that financial institutions file [SARs] does not 
work very well to detect or prevent terrorist financing, for 
there is a fundamental distinction between money laundering 
and terrorist financing.  Financial institutions have the 
information and expertise to detect the one but not the 
other.165 
Subsequent reports on detecting terrorism financing were not 
much help.  The UN Security Council, in its  first report on the Al-
Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Monitoring Team, noted that the focus 
of  the international community on countering terrorist financing 
through the formal banking system had led to the identification of 
accounts held by al-Qaeda associates.  The identification of these 
accounts would presumably lead terrorists  to seek “alternative 
means to raise and move their assets in ways that are less open to 
scrutiny,” suggesting that terrorists could be moving away from 
financial institutions entirely,166 although most likely as a result of 
the “making a list, checking it twice” system.  Subsequent reports 
reiterated this point.167  In its sixth report, the monitoring team was 
not enthusiastic about the effectiveness of preventive measures, in 
part because of the lack of guidance.168 
 
 165. JOHN ROTH ET AL., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON 
THE UNITED STATES, MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING: STAFF REPORT TO THE 
COMMISSION 52 (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff 
_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf. 
 166. United Nations Security Council, Fifth Report of the Analytical Support 
and Sanction Monitoring Team Appointed Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1526, 1617 (2004-2005), para. 49, U.N. Doc. S/2004/679  
(Aug. 25, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267 
/monitoringteam.shtml (concerning Al-Qaida, the Taliban, and associated 
individuals and entities) [hereinafter UNSC Fifth Report]. 
 167. UNSC Fifth Report, supra note 175, at para. 79 U.N.  
Doc. S/2006/750 (Sept. 20, 2006), available at, http://www.un.org/sc 
/committees/1267/monitoringteam.shtml.   
 168. United Nations Security Council, Sixth Report of the Analytical 
Support and Sanction Monitoring Team Appointed Pursuant to Security 
Counsil Resolution 1526, 1617 (2004-2005), para. 27, U.N. Doc. S/2007/132 
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Almost all states have a FIU or equivalent body charged with 
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating SARs.  The volume of SARs 
has increased tremendously, though the procedure suffers from a 
lack of guidance as to what to look for, and in many states there is 
limited capacity to examine these reports, most of which are 
generated by banks.  Only a small proportion of the reports are 
related to terrorist financing, and hardly any have been associated 
with al-Qaeda.169 
There was, however, one area that did receive considerable and 
increasing attention, and that was nonprofits/charities.  As noted in 
the discussion of the example introduced earlier in this Article, and 
as emphasized by Special Recommendation VIII, charities appeared 
(though with perhaps insufficient empirical evidence) to be involved 
fairly regularly in terrorism-financing transactions.  This was 
emphasized repeatedly in reports that could be used as guidance by 
financial institutions, their supervisors, and law enforcement, 
including FIUs.  For example, the U.S. National Money Laundering 
Strategy for 2003 stated that the practice of financing terror 
“through ostensibly charitable institutions is an important element 
in the global fight against terrorist financing” and committed the 
U.S. to countering this threat.170  In its typologies documents during 
this period, the FATF also stressed that terrorists often abused 
charities.  But even these documents focused on the importance of 
identifying terrorists and tying them to charities, rather than 
somehow identifying terrorism financing through “suspicious” 
patterns of transactions. 
For example, the 2002–03 Typologies Report discussed a case 
where a bank filed a SAR for a nonprofit client, but only because 
someone at the bank had read a newspaper article in which the 
client was mentioned as being a suspected terrorist organization.171  
However, the following year the FATF Typologies Report appeared 
to conclude that identification of terrorists is something that lies in 
the expertise of government authorities and not financial 
institutions.  “[T]he best chance of success for detecting possible 
terrorist financing links to [nonprofit organizations] is through 
intelligence or police work, which builds on links with other 
[nonprofits]  (operational, financial or through common management 
and personnel) or though connections to individuals that are already 
 
(Mar. 8, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267 
/monitoringteam.shtml (concerning Al-Qaida, the Taliban, and associated 
individuals and entities). 
 169. Id. 
 170. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY AND U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  
NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY 13 (2003), available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_10.pdf. 
 171. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON MONEY LAUNDERING 
TYPOLOGIES 2002-2003, 5–6 (2003), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/29/33/34037958.pdf. 
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suspected of terrorist or terrorist financing activities.”172 
Early in 2008, the FATF released its most comprehensive report 
to date on terrorist financing.173  With respect to suspicious 
activity/transaction reporting by financial institutions, the report 
again focused on nonprofits/charities.  The report stated that 
“suspicious transaction reporting has a central role in identifying 
terrorist financing and the movement of terrorist funds through the 
financial system,” and that “[d]espite the challenge in developing 
generic indicators of terrorist financing activity, financial 
institutions may nevertheless identify unusual characteristics about 
a transaction that should prompt the filing of a suspicious 
transaction report.”174  However, the cited cases and examples 
almost entirely dealt with organizations, including charities, or 
individuals otherwise identified as having terrorism connections.  
The only unique terrorism-financing indicators noted in the report 
were charity/relief organizations linked to transactions, sending or 
receiving funds from and/or to “locations of specific concern,” and 
“media coverage of account holder’s activities,”175 presumably when 
the media reveals that an organization or person may be connected 
to terrorism.  The problematic nature of developing a profile of 
legitimate for-profit and not-for-profit enterprises likely to engage in 
terrorist activity has not been lost on scholarly commentators.176 
The focus on charities has been reinforced by local supervisors, 
including in the United States.  For example, the U.S. FFIEC 
Manual states that financial institutions should engage in customer 
identification and client profiling, including establishing the purpose 
 
 172. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON MONEY LAUNDERING 
TYPOLOGIES 2003-2004, 11  
(2004) (emphasis added), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd 
/19/11/33624379.pdf.  The report went on to claim, 
The reporting of suspicious unusual transactions by financial  
institutions and the subsequent analysis by [financial intelligence 
units] or law enforcement also play an important role in bringing 
certain cases of suspected terrorist abuse . . . to the surface.  In some 
countries, suspicious transaction reports related to unusual 
[nonprofit] activity have actually led to the initiation of an 
investigation, while in other cases the reporting system and [financial 
intelligence unit] analysis have contributed to the development of 
further leads in ongoing investigations. 
Id.  However, it did not discuss typologies (other than those indicating money 
laundering) of use to financial institutions.  Id. 
 173. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, TERRORIST FINANCING (2008), 
available at http://www.fatf 
-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf. 
 174. Id. at 29. 
 175. Id. at 32. 
 176. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Anti-Terrorism Finance in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 303, 394 (2006) (“[I]t is 
difficult, if not impossible, to discern patterns in financial transactions that 
would signify terrorist activity.”). 
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and objectives of their stated activities, locations served, 
organizational structure, donor and volunteer base, funding and 
disbursement criteria, recordkeeping requirements, affiliation with 
other NGOs, governments, or groups, and internal controls and 
audits.  And if the financial institution determines that the charity 
is of “high risk,” then additional diligence should be performed, such 
as evaluating the principals, obtaining and reviewing the financial 
statements and audits, verifying the source and use of funds, 
valuating large contributors or grantors of the NGO, and conducting 
reference checks.177 
But the customer identification and profiling is really no 
different than that required for AML purposes, nor is there any 
indication as to when a financial institution should determine that 
there is “high risk” and that additional diligence is due.  With 
respect to organizational structure, recordkeeping requirements, 
and internal controls and audits, it might be possible to examine if 
charities are implementing best practices as to internal governance.  
Soon after the adoption of Special Recommendation VIII, the FATF 
published a paper on such best practices,178 and there has been a 
movement in many jurisdictions toward creating best practices for 
internal governance,179 including in the United States.180  However, 
the fact that there are best practices does not tell financial 
institutions how closely the charity must follow them before 
suspicion is raised, or how far the financial institution should go in 
confirming that the charity is following the practices. 
In summary, the guidance provided to financial institutions 
with respect to CFT suspicious activity/transaction reporting gives 
very little actual guidance.  First, there is the general problem that 
the basic FATF 40 preventive measures—the detection, 
examination, and reporting system for money laundering upon 
which the detection, examination, and reporting system for 
terrorism financing is based—fails to make clear how far a financial 
institution should go to identify clients, build a client profile, 
monitor transactions, and determine when a transaction is 
suspicious.  The financial institution should not go so far as to play 
 
 177. FFIEC MANUAL, supra note 119, at 281–83. 
 178. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, COMBATING THE ABUSE OF NON-PROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS (2002), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/39/19/34033761.pdf (discussing international “best practices”). 
 179. See generally Emile van der Does de Willebois, Terrorist Financing 
Networks and International Non-Profit Organizations, paper delivered at The 
University of Pennsylvania (Feb. 6, 2008) (copy on file with the author) 
(discussing developing international best practice for nonprofit governance and 
governmental oversight from the perspective of Special Recommendation VIII). 
 180. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST  
FINANCING GUIDELINES: VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED  
CHARITIES (2006), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports 
/0929%20finalrevised.pdf. 
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the role of private detective investigating in detail each client and 
each transaction, but it needs to do more than make a cursory 
review if it is to avoid sanctions. 
Next, there is little to indicate that a financial institution’s 
client is more likely to be a terrorist or terrorist financier other than 
that the client, or a person who has some control over it, is a 
terrorist or is engaging in transactions with someone who is.  And, 
there is little way for a financial institution to know that, other than 
by learning from someone else who knows, such as a government 
agency or perhaps the media, or, in other words, by “making a list 
and checking it” at least once. 
However, financial institutions may still see a serious problem.  
Special Recommendation IV does exist separately from Special 
Recommendation III.  That, plus the relatively undefined nature of 
the duties imposed on them by FATF preventive measures, plus the 
threat of serious sanctions, plus the existence of Special 
Recommendation IV may make financial institutions wary of relying 
solely on lists, whether government or media-provided.  When one 
factors in the tendency of financial institutions to react to the 
relatively undefined nature of FATF preventive measures and a 
cost-benefit analysis by over-reporting, one might expect an increase 
in SARs related to terrorism financing, and, in particular, many 
false positives. 
This seems to be the case, at least in those jurisdictions 
reporting suspicious activity/transaction reports filed as indicating 
terrorism financing.181  For example, according to FinCEN, since 
2003, when records began to be kept of SARs indicating terrorism 
financing, and up to 2007, numbers have increased five-fold, from 
155 to 687.182  Nevertheless, these numbers are still quite small 
compared to those for AML/structuring, which went from 155,468 to 
347,393.183  Also, hardly surprisingly, financial institutions tended 
to focus on charitable organizations and, in particular, nonprofits 
that involve Islamic organizations and wire activity to or from 
“suspect” states.184  If you are a financial institution and you need to 
report on someone, you might as well report on an Islamic charity. 
If the existence of Special Recommendation VIII means that 
there is a largely inaccurate tendency for financial institutions to 
vastly over-report transactions by certain charities, such over-
reporting entails many possible downsides in addition to the waste 
 
 181. See REVIEW OF FATF MUTUAL EVALUATIONS FOR TERRORISM FINANCING-
RELATED SARS (2008) (copy on file with the author). 
 182. FINCEN, SAR BY DEPOSITORY  
INSTITUTIONS, available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_by_numb_09.pdf 
 183. Id. 
 184. Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group, Trends and Analysis, 10 SAR 
ACTIVITY REVIEW: TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES 5, 10–13 (2005), available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_10.pdf. 
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of resources to financial institutions and to government.  If financial 
institutions seek to reduce costs by discriminating against certain 
charities, this can have many different social costs.  If the charities 
are more likely to be supporting charitable causes in desperate 
areas because these causes are more likely to involve terrorist 
activity, the negative effects could be magnified.185 
CONCLUSION 
FATF preventive measures for money laundering are 
sufficiently vague such that financial institutions rarely know how 
far to go when implementing them.  Financial institutions do, 
however, at least have some experience, assisted by typologies 
exercises, in identifying transactions that suggest laundering, but 
the preventive measures are hardly perfect.  Eliot Spitzer was not 
engaged in laundering the proceeds of crime, yet he was caught up 
in the preventive measures net. He was making payments to 
someone for some reason, which might conceivably be the financing 
of crime.  As it turns out, he was financing what was technically a 
crime (albeit a minor one), but there are no requirements that banks 
report suspicions of criminal financing, only financing of terrorism.  
Presumably, because he was not a charity engaging in transactions 
with other charities in certain suspect jurisdictions, the SAR did not 
indicate suspected terrorism financing. 
In effect, Spitzer used a few techniques identified by anti-money 
laundering methodologies as of the types used by launderers. Even 
though a quick analysis by the banks would show that neither 
laundering nor financing of terrorism was involved, without clear 
guidance as to how far they needed to investigate, the banks 
apparently did not undertake any serious analysis at all.  Instead, 
they filed defensive SARs.  Apparently, the authorities investigated 
because Spitzer was Governor Spitzer, not because they believed he 
was laundering the proceeds of crime or financing terrorism. 
There appears to be no reason to believe that any genuine 
terrorist financer would have engaged in similar transactions (or 
any transactions identified in typologies as indicating suspicion of 
money laundering).  Also, there appear to be no useful typologies 
indicating terrorism financing other than when known or suspected 
terrorists are involved or when charities make payments to accounts 
held by persons in certain geographical areas.  And, finally, there is 
insufficient guidance as to how far financial institutions must go to 
investigate any of these possible criminal acts to determine if a 
transaction genuinely raises suspicion, whether it be of money 
 
 185. See, e.g., Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government’s War on the 
Financing of Terrorism and Its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable 
Organizations, and Global Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341 (2004) 
(discussing extensively the liabilities imposed by the U.S. on charitable 
donations by anti-terrorism financing laws). 
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laundering or terrorism financing. 
Identifying criminal behavior should always, first and foremost, 
be the job of governments, not the private sector.  AML preventive 
measures should better recognize this fact and spell out more clearly 
how far financial institutions should have to go in investigating 
whether certain transactions may indicate the proceeds of a crime.  
This can only be accomplished by more clearly defined duties, by 
providing more information on AML typologies, and by providing 
extensive feedback to financial institutions on their suspicious 
activity/transaction reports.  In particular, a better system of 
incentives to reduce false positives while not increasing false 
negatives should be devised. 
Identifying terrorists also should be almost entirely the job of 
governments and not of financial institutions.  Terrorist financing 
typologies are too focused on certain charities to be of any use in 
distinguishing false positives and negatives.  If a charity or a person 
who controls a charity that either receives or makes a payment is 
identified as a possible terrorist, then a financial institution can 
implement the customer due diligence measures required under 
regular AML preventive measures to see if the customer is involved 
with such a person or organization.  However, it makes little sense 
to require the financial institution to decide who is a terrorist and 
who is not.  If there was ever a job for governments, that is one. 
Under the current AML/CFT system we are more likely to catch 
Eliot Spitzer than a real terrorist, and perhaps more likely to catch 
Mr. Spitzer than a real money launderer—given the huge number of 
SARs that are false positives and the poor feedback provided, it is 
impossible to know.  This system definitely must be improved if 
serious criminals, including terrorists, are to be caught. 
 
